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Introduction 
21.1 The most important case on restitution in 2010 is probably the 
Court of Appeal decision in George Raymond Zage III v Ho Chi Kwong 
[2010] 2 SLR 589 (Chan Sek Keong CJ, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA 
and V K Rajah JA) which discussed the state of knowledge required to 
establish liability for knowing receipt of misapplied trust property and 
implicitly rejected the strict liablity restitutionary analysis. In addition, 
there were a number of decisions on different aspects of the law of 
restitution. Notable on a preliminary point is Cheng William v DBS 
Bank Ltd [2010] SGHC 34 at [42] (Lai Siu Chiu J), where the court 
disallowed an application by the plaintiff at the beginning of the trial to 
amend the reliefs sought to include a claim for restitution, because such 
a claim based on unjust enrichment had not been pleaded by the 
plaintiff. This is a useful reminder that the law of unjust enrichment 
stands alongside contract and torts as an independent source of 
obligations to be considered while drafting the pleadings, and it is not a 
vague principle of justice to be resorted to as a remedy of last recourse. 
Restitution and contract 
21.2 The High Court made some important observations on the 
relationship between the law of restitution and the law of contract in 
Max Media FZ LLC v Nimbus Media Pte Ltd [2010] 2 SLR 677 (“Max 
Media v Nimbus Media”) (Andrew Ang J). The contract between the 
plaintiff and defendant gave the plaintiff the right to sell advertising 
inventory for cricket matches broadcast in the Middle East for three 
years, and required the plaintiff to make payment for each cricket event 
scheduled under the contract. Payments for each of the three years were 
to be secured by a bank guarantee for each respective year, each valid for 
a year with a further three-month period for claims. Time was specified 
to be of the essence for every payment as well as for the provision of 
each bank guarantee. The contract provided that the defendant was 
entitled to draw upon and retain the full amount of the bank guarantee 
in force in the event that the plaintiff missed three payment dates over 
the entire contract period. It also gave the defendant the right to 
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terminate the contract if the plaintiff failed to provide a bank guarantee 
in accordance with the contract or had committed material or persistent 
breaches of its obligations. 
21.3 The plaintiff duly obtained a bank guarantee for the first year, 
but failed to perform a number of obligations during that period. The 
plaintiff was late in paying or failed to pay six invoices, and failed to 
obtain the second bank guarantee. Consequently, the defendant drew on 
the first bank guarantee, being the sum of US$2.5m, and terminated the 
contract a day after. The plaintiff claimed for the return of the money 
paid out under the bank guarantee on the basis that the defendant was 
not entitled to any payment from the plaintiff for various reasons.  
The defendant argued that it was entitled to keep the money and 
counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract. At trial, the parties’ 
dispute was confined to whether the plaintiff was liable for post-
termination damages and for three uninvoiced events: Max Media v 
Nimbus Media at [18]. 
21.4 The court applied the established principles on penalties and 
found that, in the circumstances, the clause providing for the bank 
guarantee was not penal but specified legitimate liquidated damages: 
Max Media v Nimbus Media at [26]–[28]. The court also found that the 
plaintiff was liable for post-termination damages, either because the 
defendant had terminated the contract based on a breach of condition 
or breach of an innominate term resulting in substantial losses to the 
defendant. Although it was not necessary to the decision, in view of the 
court’s other conclusions, the court also found that the plaintiff was 
liable to pay for the three uninvoiced events. Thus, the plaintiff ’s claim 
was dismissed while the defendant’s counterclaim was allowed. 
21.5 The plaintiff ’s restitutionary claim failed because the court 
accepted the defendant’s argument that (Max Media v Nimbus Media  
at [24]): 
… ordinarily, restitutionary principles are supplemental to the law of 
contract where the parties are in a contractual relationship … The 
rationale behind this general rule is that the law of restitution should 
not redistribute the risks which the parties have, by contract, already 
allocated. 
21.6 Thus, as the defendant had a valid contractual right to keep the 
money, the plaintiff ’s restitutionary claim must fail. 
Total failure of consideration 
21.7 Even though it was not in issue on the facts, the court in Max 
Media v Nimbus Media made the following useful observations in 
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respect of the restitutionary claim for failure of consideration after the 
termination of a contract (Max Media v Nimbus Media at [24]): 
Nonetheless, one recognised exception where restitution may apply to 
a contract is where the consideration for the contract has failed. The 
relevant principle applicable here is this: where money has been paid 
out under a contract that is or becomes ineffective, the payer may 
recover the money if the consideration for the payment has totally 
failed; but this right of recovery only arises where there is no express or 
implied term in the contract making the payment irrecoverable … 
[emphasis in original] 
21.8 The court noted that the failure of consideration is to be judged 
from the payer’s point of view and refers not to the promise which is 
referred to as the consideration, but the performance of the promise: 
Max Media v Nimbus Media at [24]. The court observed that the failure 
must be “total” because consideration is normally viewed as whole and 
indivisible and that the court will not divide or apportion it unless the 
parties clearly intended it to be divisible. Hence, partial failure of 
consideration will normally bar a claim in unjust enrichment unless the 
contract is a divisible one. 
21.9 The distinction between a claim for reliance damages for breach 
of contract and a claim for restitution on the basis of total failure of 
consideration was discussed by the High Court in PT Panosonic Gobel 
Indonesia v Stratech Systems Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 1017 (“Panosonic Gobel”) 
(Philip Pillai JC). This was an appeal by the defendant from a decision 
of the assistant registrar who had awarded the contract price to the 
plaintiff as damages for breach of contract. The defendant argued that 
the plaintiff had not proven any loss and that the award could only be 
justified on the basis of restitution for total failure of consideration but 
that the plaintiff had not proven the total failure of consideration. The 
High Court dismissed the appeal. The court agreed with the observation 
of the assistant registrar that even though a claim for return of the 
contract price as reliance damages superficially resembled a claim for 
restitution for total failure of consideration, the two claims were based 
on materially different conceptual bases (expenditure in reliance and 
unjust enrichment respectively) and the former cannot be used as a 
backdoor means of failing to plead the latter: Panosonic Gobel at [7]. On 
the facts, the plaintiff ’s claim was based on contract and not restitution. 
The High Court affirmed the decision on the basis that the plaintiff 
could opt for either expectation or reliance damages for breach of 
contract, and the defendant had not shown that the plaintiff had 
received any benefit to offset its prima facie reliance expenditure. 
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Misrepresentation 
21.10 In Chee Jok Heng Stephanie v Chang Yue Shoon [2010] 3 SLR 1131 
(“Chee Jok Heng”) (Woo Bih Li J), the High Court found that the 
plaintiff had been deceived by the defendant into believing that the 
defendant was a lawyer who could assist her in criminal investigations 
made against her by the Commercial Affairs Department (“CAD”). As a 
result, the plaintiff had paid him $15,000 per month for three months 
($45,000). In addition, the court also found that after the plaintiff sold a 
property, she was falsely advised by the defendant that the proceeds may 
be seized by the CAD, and consequently the plaintiff had handed a 
cheque for $682,000, which was part of the proceeds of the sale, to the 
defendant to prevent any such seizure. The plaintiff sought restitution of 
the two amounts. The court allowed both claims. 
21.11 The claim for $45,000 was allowed on the basis that it had to be 
returned after the contract for services was rescinded for fraudulent 
misrepresentation: Chee Jok Heng at [18] and [45]. The court did not 
address the issue of restitutio in integrum, even though it appeared from 
the evidence that the defendant did perform considerable work for the 
plaintiff notwithstanding the false pretences: Chee Jok Heng at [46]. 
However, in view of the view expressed by the court in respect of any 
quantum meruit claim (see paras 21.15 ff below), it would appear that 
any argument from the defendant about impossibility of restitutio in 
integrum or compensation for his services in the course of working out 
the consequences of rescision may well have received short shrift from 
the court. In principle, however, upon the rescission of a contract even 
for fraudulent misrepresentation, the court would endeavour to act to 
prevent the unjust enrichment of the representee (see, eg, Spence v 
Crawford [1939] 3 All ER 271 (HL) where the House of Lords affirmed 
the need for counter-restitution by the representee as a general rule for 
the rescission of a contract induced by fraudulent misrepresentation). It 
should be borne in mind that remedies in tort may also be available to 
the plaintiff for losses caused by the fraud. 
21.12 The claim for $682,000 succeeded on two grounds. One ground 
was money had and received (Chee Jok Heng at [45]), on the basis that it 
was money procured by deception: Chee Jok Heng at [25] and [28]. The 
basis for restitution would be mistake, albeit induced by the defendant. 
While it may look like misprediction at first blush (whether the CAD 
was going to seize the assets), it is generally quite easy to find a mistake 
of fact (whether the defendant had a reasonable basis for stating that the 
assets may be seized) to justify liability in cases of fraud. 
21.13 The second basis was that the money was handed to the 
defendant to hold either on an express trust because of the 
arrangements between the parties, or on a constructive trust because of 
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the defendant’s fraud in inducing the transfer of property: Chee Jok 
Heng at [43]. 
21.14 The two bases of liability can co-exist conceptually though 
practically double recovery will not be permitted; the former is a 
personal liability to pay as a result of receiving legal property in the 
money, and the other refers to a proprietary equitable right of the 
plaintiff in the legal property received by the defendant. As there was no 
indication of the solvency or otherwise of the defendant, it would not 
have mattered to the plaintiff which basis of liability was relied on, 
except possibly as to interest. The court ordered that no interest was 
payable by the defendant in the circumstances: Chee Jok Heng at [47]. 
This was presumably pursuant to the exercise of the discretionary power 
of the court to award interest under s 12 of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 
1999 Rev Ed) and para 6 of the First Sched of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed). No argument appeared to have 
been raised as to whether there was a restitutionary right to interest on 
the basis that the claim was for money had and received (see Sempra 
Metals Ltd v Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Inland Revenue and Customs 
[2008] 1 AC 561 and The Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v Reliance National 
Asia Re Pte Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 385 at [134]–[135]), or the equitable 
jurisdiction to award interest arising from the plaintiff ’s beneficial 
interest in the property held by the defendant. 
Quantum meruit 
21.15 In Chee Jok Heng, although no counterclaim was made by the 
defendant in respect of services rendered by the defendant to the 
plaintiff while fraudulently pretending to be the plaintiff ’s lawyer, the 
court observed that it would be hesitant to reward a person who had 
provided services on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentations: Chee 
Jok Heng at [46]. The court was concerned that the law should not 
encourage fraudsters. 
21.16 If the conduct of the defendant had amounted to the offence of 
cheating or of practising law without a licence, then the plaintiff may be 
able to plead illegality as a defence to a quantum meruit claim, to 
prevent the defendant from profitting from a crime. Aside from these 
considerations, it is doubtful that as a matter of public policy,  
a fraudulent misrepresentor cannot claim in restitution for the value of 
services conferred on the representee in a voidable contract; the law 
already acts to prevent him from taking the benefit of the contract. 
Whether the representee has been unjustly enriched at the expense of 
the representor is an issue that is independent of the fraud of the 
representor. On the other hand, on the basis that the representee may be 
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liable in restitution, it may be possible for her to argue subjective 
devaluation as a result of the misrepresentation. 
21.17 The distinction between contractual and restitutionary quantum 
meruit was discussed again in MGA International Pte Ltd v Wajilam 
Exports (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2010] SGHC 319 (Belinda Ang Saw Ean J). 
As the case dealt with contractual quantum meruit on the facts (ie, there 
was agreement to pay remuneration but the quantum was not fixed), 
little was said of the restitutionary quantum meruit claim. 
21.18 Since the computation of the quantum would be the same in 
both the restitutionary and the contractual claim in most cases, as the 
court in both sitautions will be ascertaining the market value of the 
services rendered, it might be thought that at least on the question of 
quantification, cases on one type of quantum meruit claim would be of 
persuasive value in cases of the other type. It is, thus, unnecessary to 
classify the case of Way v Latilla [1937] 2 All ER 759 (HL) as a case of 
contractual quantum meruit (as the court did at MGA International Pte 
Ltd v Wajilam Exports (Singapore) Pte Ltd at [123]) if it is only to be 
used as a guide on the question of valuation of the benefit received. 
Discharge of another’s debt 
21.19 The High Court in SHC Capital Ltd v NTUC Income Insurance 
Co-operative Ltd [2010] 4 SLR 965 (“SHC Capital”) (Chan Seng Onn J) 
considered the issue of when a contribution or reimbursement claim 
may be made when the plaintiff has paid a third party to whom the 
defendant owed a debt. 
21.20 A workman was injured in the course of work by an employee 
of one of the sub-contractors involved in a construction project, and 
had sued a number of parties, including his own employer (E) and the 
sub-contractor (S) which had engaged E. All parties were found liable 
and S and E were apportioned 26.7% of the blame (without any further 
subdivision of blame). Both S and E had been insured by both the 
plaintiff and the defendant for liability to their respective employees. 
The plaintiff appeared to have indemnified S and E (by paying the 
injured workman) after the defendant denied liability on the policies, 
and then sought contribution and/or reimbursement from the 
defendant. 
21.21 After careful and detailed examination of the policy documents, 
the court found as a matter of construction that the defendant’s policies 
covered both S’s and E’s liability to the workman but the plaintiff ’s 
policies did not. Thus, there could be no claim for contribution since 
there was no common liability. Further, the payment made by the 
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plaintiff was not made under legal compulsion since the plaintiff was 
under no legal liability to S and E. However, the court held that the 
plaintiff ’s claim for reimbursement could succeed if it had not acted 
voluntarily in making the payment. The court found that the plaintiff 
had not acted voluntarily and held that the defendant was obliged to 
reimburse the plaintiff for the sum paid. The court found that the 
plaintiff had not acted voluntarily because S and E had made claims 
against both insurers and the defendant had denied liability so the 
plaintiff had decided to make payment first before sorting out the 
matter with the defendant. Refusal to pay in such circumstances would 
have undermined the plaintiff ’s own business reputation: SHC Capital 
at [48]. Although the court considered that the plaintiff would have 
acted voluntarily to the extent that it had paid in respect of S’s liability 
to its “employees” because it failed to make inquiries whether 
“employee” under its own policy included the injured workman who 
had not been employed by S directly, the court decided that the plaintiff 
had in fact paid in respect of E’s liability alone: SHC Capital at [49]–[50]. 
21.22 The court held that the doctrines of contribution and 
reimbursement were both based on the principle against unjust 
enrichment of a defendant who has benefited by the extinction of his 
liability (in whole or in part) because of a payment by the plaintiff to a 
creditor: SHC Capital at [38]. The court further observed that from this 
basis, the law may allow a claim for contribution even where the 
plaintiff and defendant were under no common liability to be sued 
(SHC Capital at [39]), so long as there is community of interest in the 
subject matter to which the burden is attached. However, this principle 
was not pursued since the court had allowed the claim for 
reimbursement. 
21.23 Three comments may be made. First, it was assumed that the 
defendant’s liability had been discharged by the plaintiff ’s payment. The 
defendant can be enriched only if its liability has been extinguished. As a 
matter of law, this would follow from the finding of an involuntary 
payment by the plaintiff, in the absence of adoption by the debtor of the 
payment. 
21.24 Secondly, the court proceeded on general principles of the law 
of restitution and did not confine its ruling to the context of  
co-insurers. The extension of the concept of compulsion to action to 
protect one’s business reputation could have wide-ranging implications 
for the law of restitution, far beyond the context of co-insurers. 
21.25 Thirdly, no claim was apparently mounted on the basis of a 
payment made under a mistake (of law) as to the plaintiff ’s own liability 
to pay. This might have provided a more conservative basis for recovery 
without adopting a wide interpretation of involuntariness. However, the 
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main problem with the mistaken payment approach is that as a general 
rule, the debt of the defendant is not discharged by a mistaken payment 
of the plaintiff (Barclays Bank Ltd v Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd 
[1980] QB 677), which means that the proper defendant would have 
been E rather than the co-insurer. One possible solution in this type of 
scenario, to avoid circuity of action, is to allow the plaintiff to subrogate 
to the insured’s claim against the co-insurer as a restitutionary remedy 
against the insured. 
Duress 
21.26 It had previously been noted ((2008) 9 SAL Ann Rev 434  
at 435–436, paras 20.7–20.8) that in Tam Tak Chuen v Khairul Bin Abdul 
Rahman [2009] 2 SLR(R) 240 (“Tam Tak Chuen”), the High Court 
(Judith Prakash J) had applied the causation test for duress to the 
person to a case of economic duress. Thus, in both types of duress, after 
the plaintiff has demonstrated illegitimate pressure, the burden shifts to 
the defendant that it did not cause the plaintiff to enter into the 
transaction, and the duress need only be one reason for entering into 
the transaction. However, in E C Investment Holding Pte Ltd v Ridout 
Residence Pte Ltd [2010] SGHC 270, the High Court (Quentin Loh J), 
while not expressing a view on the burden of proof, cited with approval 
a passage from Treitel, The Law of Contract (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
12th Ed, 2007) at para 10-005 that, for economic duress, the threat must 
be shown to be a significant cause to satisfy the “but for” test. Like Tam 
Tak Chuen, this was also a contract case, but both cases are relevant to 
the law of restitution because the same doctrine of duress applies. 
Knowing receipt 
Standard of liability 
21.27 In George Raymond Zage III v Ho Chi Kwong [2010] 2 SLR 589 
(“George Raymond Zage III”), the Court of Appeal affirmed the 
difference between liability for dishonest assistance and liability for 
knowing receipt. In the view of the court, passive receipt cannot amount 
to assistance. The court followed the test of objective dishonesty restated 
in Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust International Ltd [2006]  
1 WLR 1476 (PC, Isle of Man) for dishonest assistance. Thus, the court 
held that the imposition of liability for dishonest assistance of breach of 
trust requires the defendant to have such knowledge of the irregular 
shortcomings of the transaction that ordinary honest people would 
consider it to be a breach of standards of honest conduct if he failed to 
make adequate inquiries. 
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21.28 On the other hand, the threshold for imposing liability for 
knowing receipt, while similar to that for dishonest assistance, was 
different. Rejecting the strict liability view, the court held that the 
recipient’s state of knowledge had to be such as to render it 
unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of the receipt. Although the 
argument that there was a parallel concurrent liability in unjust 
enrichment did not appear to have been pressed, the court took notice 
of Lord Nicholls’ argument to this effect in “Knowing Receipt: The Need 
for a New Landmark”, in Restitution Past, Present and Future (Cornish, 
Nolan, O’Sullivan & Virgo eds) (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998). Thus, 
this case appears to have settled for Singapore law that the basis of 
knowing receipt is not the principle against unjust enrichment as such 
(though it does not rule out an analysis in terms of restitution for a 
wrong). 
21.29 The court also provided important guidance on when it would 
be appropriate to make a finding of unconscionability. Much will 
depend on the facts of particular cases, and industry practice may be a 
relevant consideration. Actual knowledge of the source of funds is not a 
necessary requirement, especially when there are unusual circumstances. 
In particular, the court would be slow to impute knowledge of 
wrongdoing in the context of commercial transactions. Merchants are 
not ordinarily expected to ask probing questions of a customer’s source 
of funds. 
21.30 On the facts, payment had been made by a rogue lawyer out of 
his client’s account to the defendant for the purchase of jewellery by a 
telegraphic transfer and then a cash cheque. The Court of Appeal 
affirmed the High Court’s finding that the defendant was not liable in 
respect of the telegraphic transfer payment. Although the phrase 
“client’s accounts” appeared on the transfer slip, the court affirmed the 
finding of the High Court that the staff of the defendant could not 
reasonably have noticed it. On the other hand, reversing the High Court 
on this point, the Court of Appeal found that its staff had been put on 
notice by the words “client’s accounts” in the cash cheque it had received 
from the buyer, and it was consequently liable for knowing receipt for 
this sum. The court held that an honest retailer should know or suspect 
that it was inappropriate for a lawyer to draw on his firm’s clients’ 
accounts for personal expenses: George Raymond Zage III at [48]–[51]). 
21.31 The Court of Appeal further pointed out (George Raymond 
Zage III at [51]) that it had not been argued whether the defendant had, 
by the receipt of the cash cheque, also been put on notice about the 
earlier receipt of money by telegraphic tranfer. This observation is 
consistent with the theme in the judgment that liability for knowing 
receipt arises because it is unconscionable for the defendant to retain the 
benefit of the receipt when the defendant has sufficient knowledge of 
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the circusmtances. However, the court did not examine this issue further 
as no evidence or argument had been presented on this point. In theory, 
the application of this argument will depend to some extent on  
whether the dealings between the lawyer and the defendant are seen as a 
single transaction or a series of transactions. The defence of bona fide 
purchaser (which would have put an end to all proprietary and personal 
claims in equity) operates at the time of the transaction. 
Basis of knowing receipt liability 
21.32 It is also worth noting that in the Hong Kong SAR, the Court of 
Final Appeal in Thanakharn Kasikorn Thai Chamkat (Mahachon) v Akai 
Holdings Ltd [2010] HKCFA 64 (“Thanakharn Kasikorn”) observed that 
the remedy of equitable compensation was available for knowing 
receipt. The further significance of this case lies in the observation of 
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury NPJ, who delivered the only reasoned 
judgment (and with whom Ma CJ, Bokhary, Chan and Ribeiro PJJ 
agreed), that the quantum of equitable compensation would be 
measured in the same way as the tortious measure for conversion 
damages which was also successfully claimed in that case. 
21.33 The question whether the defendant had received assets 
transferred in breach of trust or fiduciary duty and traceable to the 
property of the plaintiff was somewhat glossed over by Lord Neuberger: 
he explained that, accepting that the legal title in the property remained 
in the hands of the plaintiff to sustain the plaintiff ’s conversion claim, 
once the defendant sold the property, he could be liable for receiving the 
equitable property of the plaintiff in the proceeds of sale: Thanakharn 
Kasikorn at [141]. However, this is hard to fit within traditional 
doctrines of equity. If the plaintiff had equitable interest in the proceeds 
of sale, it is because the defendant has become a constructive trustee of 
the proceeds; if so, the defendant was already accountable for the money 
without more and was not a stranger to the trust on whom knowing 
receipt liability needed to be imposed. In any event, Lord Neuberger 
appeared to be prepared to expand the scope of knowing receipt beyond 
the receipt of property in breach of trust or fiduciary duty in which the 
plaintiff has an equitable interest: Thanakharn Kasikorn at [142]–[143]. 
21.34 Lord Neuberger’s approach to the remedy for knowing receipt 
appears to echo the minority judgment of Arden LJ in Charter plc v City 
Index Ltd [2007] Ch 313 where she held that a claim based on knowing 
receipt was based on a wrong committed by the defendant, and the 
remedy could be either an account of profits or compensatory damages. 
In this context, it is also notable (albeit in a different context) that 
liability for knowing receipt was characterised as a form of accessory 
liability in Zim Integrated Shipping Services Ltd v Dafni Igal [2010]  
2 SLR 426 at [23] (Lai Siu Chiu J). 
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21.35 The development in Hong Kong SAR goes further than the 
Singapore Court of Appeal’s decision in George Raymond Zage III v Ho 
Chi Kwong (above, para 21.27), though it is not necessarily inconsistent 
with it. On the approach of the final appellate court of Hong Kong SAR 
of the basis of the knowing receipt claim, there are potentially two 
additional remedies apart from the usual one of making the defendant 
pay the amount received in breach of trust to restore the trust funds to 
its original state. It would seem that the knowing recipient, like the 
dishonest assister, can be liable for profits made from the 
receipt/assistance. If the focus of liability in knowing receipt is on 
compensation, it may also be that the knowing recipient will be liable to 
compensate for consequential losses beyond the deprivation of trust 
funds as a result of the breach of trust. On this approach, it will be very 
difficult to distinguish conceptually between the basis of liability for 
knowing receipt and that for dishonest assistance. It is then difficult to 
see why a higher threshold of knowledge and unconscionability is 
required in the case of active participation than in the case of passive 
receipt to impose liability. 
Knowing receipt and breach of contract 
21.36 Historically, liability as a constructive trustee for knowing 
receipt was based on the third party receiving money that was the 
subject of a breach of trust, or a breach of fiduciary duty. This reflected 
the historical protection of the plaintiff ’s subsisting equitable interest in 
property. Significantly, in Baldor Electric (Asia) Pte Ltd v Liew Chin Choy 
[2010] SGHC 32, the High Court (Tay Yong Kwang J) was prepared to 
extend liability for knowing receipt to the receipt by a third party of 
money that was the subject of the breach, not of any trust or fiduciary 
duty, but of a contractual duty of fidelity and good faith owed to the 
plaintiff. 
21.37 The first defendant was employed by the plaintiff as a sales 
manager. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had acquired an 
interest in an Indonesian company and wrongfully (ie, without 
authority) appointed that company as the distributor of the plaintif ’s 
products and diverted the plaintiff ’s corporate opportunities to that 
company, in return for which he received secret payments from the 
Indonesian company, some of which were paid into the second 
defendant’s account. The plaintiff claimed against the defendant for, 
inter alia, alleged breaches of fiduciary duties and duties of fidelity and 
good faith. The plaintiff also claimed against the second defendant, the 
wife of the first defendant, as a contructive trustee (in knowing receipt), 
in respect of money received by her from her husband and paid into a 
USD account opened by her. 
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21.38 The court found that the first defendant, who was not a senior 
employee of the plaintiff, did not owe fiduciary duties to the plaintiff. 
The court, however, found that the first defendant owed and breached 
implied contractual duties of fidelity and good faith. The court found 
that the second defendant was not liable, but only because it found that 
on the facts she did not possess sufficient knowledge of the source of the 
funds to be liable in knowing receipt. 
21.39 An extension of the doctrine of knowing receipt from its 
original basis of the protection of property subject to trust and fiduciary 
institutions to breaches of contractual duties of fidelity and good faith, 
requires very careful consideration. Although liability in knowing 
receipt is a personal liability, it still depends on the third party receiving 
property in which the plaintiff has an equitable interest. Where the 
plaintiff ’s claim is based on breach of contract only and in the absence 
of a fiduciary duty, it is not clear how the plaintiff has an equitable 
interest in the money received. One argument is that the plaintiff ’s 
equitable interest is established because the first defendant would have 
been liable to account to the plaintiff for his profits in equity under the 
principle in Attorney-General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268. However, this 
accountability gives rise to a personal remedy only, and this argument 
only works if the defendant also holds the profits on a constructive trust 
for the plaintiff, and neither Attorney-General v Blake nor the 
Commonwealth and Singapore authorities following it have gone so far. 
In any event, the Singapore Court of Appeal in MFM Restaurants Pte Ltd v 
Fish & Co Restaurants Pte Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 150 at [54] (Chao Hick Tin, 
Andrew Phang Boon Leong and V K Rajah JJA) preferred to see the 
Attorney-General v Blake claim as one for restitutionary damages, thus 
emphasising the personal nature of the liability. This extension may well 
be justified on Lord Neuberger’s suggestion on the broadening of the 
scope of knowing receipt in Thanakharn Kasikorn (above, para 21.32), 
but one should be extremely cautious about taking this approach. 
Restitution for wrongs 
21.40 Although the primary issue in MFM Restaurants Pte Ltd v Fish 
& Co Restaurants Pte Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 150 (“MFM v Fish & Co”) was 
the question of remoteness of damages in the law of contract, the Court 
of Appeal made some references to the recovery of gains made from the 
breach of contract. The court (MFM v Fish & Co at [55]) referring to the 
terminological difficulty in Attorney-General v Blake (above, para 21.39) 
(whether an account of profits or restitutionary damages), noted that 
the law was still in flux (MFM v Fish & Co at [52]), and referred briefly 
(without attempting to provide answers) to two main conceptual 
difficulties: how exceptional should the circumstances be to warrant 
such a remedy, and whether its explanation lies in unjust enrichment or 
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compensation: MFM v Fish & Co at [55]. The court also briefly referred 
to the possibility of developing punitive damages for breach of contract 
(MFM v Fish & Co at [52]–[53]), though it did not go into the 
relationship between punitive and restitutionary damages. 
21.41 Attorney-General v Blake (above, para 21.39) was applied by 
analogy in Cheong Lay Yong v Muthukumaran s/o Varthan [2010] 3 SLR 16 
(Quentin Loh JC). The plaintiff-purchaser’s claims for specific 
performance, interest for late completion and account of rent in respect 
of an agreement for the sale of immovable property succeeded in the 
High Court. The court awarded late completion interest as liquidated 
damages at 10% per annum in accordance with the terms of the 
contract. 
21.42 The court also ordered the defendant to account for the net rent 
from the date of contractual completion: Cheong Lay Yong v 
Muthukumaran s/o Varthan [2010] 3 SLR 16 (“Cheong Lay Yong”) at [47]. 
The court was conspicuously cautious in approaching this issue, 
regretting that more arguments had not been presented to the court on 
the point: Cheong Lay Yong at [47]. 
21.43 The court decided that condition 8 in the contract relating to 
the apportionment of rent did not apply to the facts because no actual 
completion had taken place: Cheong Lay Yong at [53]. The court held 
that condition 6 specifying interest as liquidated damages for late 
completion did not preclude other remedies; it was only intended to 
deal with losses arising from the delay in completion: Cheong Lay Yong 
at [54]. Resorting to first principles, the court held that, because specific 
performance was available, the defendant became a qualified trustee of 
the property on behalf of the plaintiff, and was thereby accountable to 
the plaintiff for any rental income (less the outgoings). In theory, the 
defendant became a trustee once the contract for sale is made; the 
account was ordered from the contractual date of completion probably 
because the intention of the parties manifested in condition 8 was that 
the vendor was entitled to rent and liable for the outgoings until the 
contractual date of performance. Presumably, the fact that the clause did 
not technically apply until actual completion does not mean that the 
parties’ intentions on the apportionment would be ignored, since the 
clause would bite upon actual completion anyway in view of the order 
for specific performance. 
21.44 The court laid considerable emphasis on the findings that the 
defendant had cynically breached the contract and had behaved badly 
towards the plaintiff: Cheong Lay Yong at [59]. While accepting that 
remedies may be alternative or cumulative, and that the former situation 
called for an election by the plaintiff (Cheong Lay Yong at [57]), the court 
held that in the exceptional circumstances of the present case, the 
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account of rent should be in addition to the claim for damages for late 
completion to prevent the defendant from benefitting from his wrong. 
The court was concerned that otherwise the defendant could use the 
rental income to offset the damages payable and thereby profit from his 
wrong (Cheong Lay Yong at [58]–[59]). The court was careful to state 
that in other cases where there is a genuine dispute between the parties, 
there may be legitimate arguments why an account of rent should not 
be ordered in addition to the claim for damages for late payment: 
Cheong Lay Yong at [59]. 
21.45 Six comments may be made. First, while the court’s disapproval 
of the defendant’s conduct was understandable in the circumstances, it 
should also be noted that cynical breach as a ground for awarding gains 
made from breach of contract was deprecated in Attorney-General v 
Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 at 286 itself, and this passage was endorsed by the 
Singapore Court of Appeal in Teh Guek Ngor Engelin v Chia Ee Lin 
Evelyn [2005] 3 SLR(R) 22 at [18]. The High Court in the present case 
also relied on the distasteful way in which the defendant had behaved 
towards the plaintiff and had conducted the litigation, but this was 
addressed in the costs awarded: Cheong Lay Yong at [61]–[63]. 
21.46 Secondly, Attorney-General v Blake (above, para 21.39) was not 
directly applied, because the court found justification for the account of 
net rent from basic trusteeship principles. Thus, the plaintiff does not 
need to establish exceptional circumstances to establish a claim for net 
rent. The only question was whether the claim for net rent was 
inconsistent with the claim for damages for late completion. 
21.47 Thirdly, while the existence of exceptional circumstances was 
used in Attorney-General v Blake to justify the award of gains from 
breach of contract, in this case, the existence of exceptional 
circumstances was used to allow the recovery of the defendant’s gains in 
addition to the recovery of the plaintiff ’s losses. 
21.48 Fourthly, the claims respectively for damages and net rent are 
either cumulative or alternative. If they are cumulative, then no 
exceptional circumstances are required for both to be allowed. Thus, 
exceptional circumstances are required only if the two are alternative,  
ie, they could lead to double recovery. 
21.49 Fifthly, whether the two claims are cumulative or alternative 
depends on a question of construction whether the loss from delay in 
condition 6 included the loss of the ability of the plaintiff to rent out the 
property as a result of late completion. This is arguably a loss 
attributable to the delay in completion. Unfortunately, this critical 
question of construction did not receive much attention from the court, 
as the issue had not been argued. 
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21.50 Sixthly, since the court justified its decision on exceptional 
circumstances, its decision must rest on the view that the remedies were 
alternative, ie, that the losses mentioned in condition 6 included the 
plaintiff ’s losses from her inability to exploit the property by rental after 
the contractual date of completion. Thus, the unsalutary conduct of the 
defendant was used as exceptional circumstances to justify double 
recovery. This has a similar effect as an award of punitive damages for 
breach of contract. 
Illegality 
21.51 Illegality was raised as a defence to the claim for $682,000 in 
Chee Jok Heng (above, para 21.10). The defendant argued that the 
purpose of the plaintiff ’s payment of that sum was to avoid seizure by 
the CAD, which was a prima facie illegal purpose. The defence was 
dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff did not need to rely on the 
illegality as she could simply rely on an express or constructive trust, 
following Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340 and TopTen Entertainment 
Pte Ltd v Lucky Red Investments Ltd [2004] 4 SLR(R) 559. 
21.52 The court did not address the outcome of the defence on the 
alternative basis of liability in an action for money had and received. On 
this basis of claim, the plaintiff would be bereft of the advantage of 
simply relying on title to make out her claim, and so cannot rely on 
Tinsley v Milligan. Indeed, the illegal purpose would have been disclosed 
in setting out the mistake leading to the payment. 
21.53 In Aqua Art Pte Ltd v Goodman Development (S) Pte Ltd [2010] 
4 SLR 86 (“Aqua Art”), the High Court (Choo Han Teck J) disallowed a 
claim for the return of a deposit after a contract for the sale of property 
was declared to be null and void for contravening s 3 of the Residential 
Property Act (Cap 274, 2009 Rev Ed), which prohibits a foreigner from 
owning certain types of residential property without permission. The 
plaintiff, a foreign-owned company, claimed the return of the deposit 
on the ground that it had been induced into entering the contract by the 
misrepresentation of the defendant to the effect that the property had 
been zoned commercial when it fact it was partly residential. 
21.54 On the facts, the court found that the plaintiff knew of the 
zoning at the time of the payment of the deposit. Thus, the claim that 
there was mispresentation failed: Aqua Art at [6]. It was not clear from 
the judgment, however, whether the claim was based in the tort of 
misrepresentation (with the quantum of the deposit being the resulting 
loss) or a restitutionary claim based on mistaken payment induced by a 
mispresentation. 
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21.55 The plaintiff further claimed for the return of the deposit as a 
“natural consequence” of the void contract: Aqua Art at [7]. The court 
took the view that s 3 of the Residential Property Act (Cap 274, 
2009 Rev Ed) did not prohibit the recovery of a deposit paid under a 
contract rendered void by that provision. However, the court held that 
recovery would be permitted only in cases where the plaintiff could 
show that it had a strong case that it would only be fair and just that he 
recovers the money. On the facts, the court held that the plaintiff knew 
about the prohibition and probably knew that the property was 
residential and the evidence indicated that it was not safe to pay the 
deposit without verification or contractual protection, and the 
defendant at all relevant times did not know that the plaintiff was not 
entitled to purchase the property. 
21.56 The court noted that two earlier cases had denied recovery to 
the purchaser (Cheng Mun Siah v Tan Nam Sui [1979–1980] SLR(R) 611 
and Lim Xue Shan v Ong Kim Cheong [1990] 2 SLR(R) 102). The court 
further noted that the High Court in Tan Cheow Gek v Gimly Holdings 
Pte Ltd [1992] 2 SLR(R) 240 had allowed the purchaser to recover a 
deposit held by a stakeholder on the basis that the vendor was only 
entitled to forfeit the deposit if the purchaser was the party in default. 
However, the court distinguished the last case by observing that a 
plaintiff who knew that he could not buy property could not be in a 
better position than a plaintiff who did not have such knowledge (Aqua 
Art at [7]). Although it made no express reference to it, the court was 
probably referring to the non in pari delicto doctrine and found it 
inapplicable on the facts. The relevant restitutionary causes of action 
appear to have been mistaken payment and total failure of 
consideration. 
21.57 This decision was reversed in Aqua Art Pte Ltd v Goodman 
Development (S) Pte Ltd [2011] SGCA 7 (Chao Hick Tin, Andrew Phang 
Boon Leong and VK Rajah JJA). The Court of Appeal reversed the 
finding on the knowledge of the plaintiff, and allowed restitutionary 
recovery based on mistake. This case will be discussed in the next 
volume. 
Limitation periods 
21.58 In Chip Hup Hup Kee Construction Pte Ltd v Yeow Chern Lean 
[2010] 3 SLR 213 (“Chip Hup Hup Kee”), the High Court (Andrew 
Ang J) held that a claim for money had and received for the proceeds of 
the conversion of a cheque was a claim founded in tort for the purpose 
s 69(1)(a) of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed). The Court of 
Appeal in Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 473 v De Beers 
Jewellery Ptd Ltd [2002] 1 SLR(R) 418 (CA) had held that a claim based 
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on unjust enrichment – in that case, a claim for the return of mistaken 
payment – was not a claim founded in tort, contract, or equity, and so 
did not fall within any relevant provisions of the Limitation Act. The 
court noted various academic views as well as the difference of approach 
between England and Singapore on whether restitutionary claims are 
caught by references in the Limitation Act to “contract”. The court 
ultimately distinguished the Court of Appeal case on the basis that the 
claim in the instant case, based on waiver of tort, was an alternative 
response to the tort, and was thus founded on tort for the purpose of 
the Limitation Act. The court noted (Chip Hup Hup Kee at [24]) that: “It 
is undesirable, as a general principle, that restitutionary claims should 
remain at large.” The court did not refer to the possible use of laches as 
an alternative to statutory limitation; obviously the legislative solution is 
the more conceptually and practically satisfactory one. 
Jurisdiction of the District Court 
21.59 In the previous volume ((2009) 10 SAL Ann Rev 433 at 453, 
para 21.63), it was noted that the District Court in The Redwood Tree Pte 
Ltd v CPL Trading Pte Ltd [2009] SGDC 204 had decided that a claim in 
restitution did not fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
District Court. This case was cited with approval in Management 
Corporation Strata Title Plan No 2911 v Tham Keng Mun [2010]  
SGHC 326 at [44]. Although this was not a case on the law of 
restitution, the High Court (Woo Bih Li J) in this case was considering 
the general question whether the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
District Court was strictly confined to the matters expressly spelt out in 
the Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed). The court held that 
it was so. The court also noted the (then pending) amendments to the 
Subordinate Courts Act (which have since taken effect from 1 January 
2011) which removed the restrictions on the jurisdiction of the District 
Court to certain types of subject matter. The intention of the 
Subordinate Courts (Amendment) Act (No 31 of 2010) was to place the 
civil subject matter jurisdiction of the District Court on the same 
footing as the High Court, with some exceptions relating to monetary 
limits and judicial review. Restitutionary claims would clearly fall within 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the District Court as a result. 
